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Abstract  
Purpose- We investigate the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institution (AAOIFI) governance 
disclosure in Islamic Banks. 
Design/methodology/approach- To test our research hypotheses, we create a 
comprehensive AAOIFI governance disclosure index and use regression analysis for a 
sample of Islamic banks for the financial years within the period 2013-2015.  
 
Findings- We find that audit committee size is the main determinant of the AAOIFI 
governance disclosure.  
Originality/value- The research contributes to Islamic accounting literature, by identifying 
the driver for the AAOIFI governance disclosure for Islamic banks that mandatorily adopt 
AAOIFI standards. 
Keywords- AAOIFI Governance Standards, Corporate Governance, Islamic Banks, Disclosure 
Paper type- Research paper. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 2007 global financial crisis, a large number of studies have focused on corporate 
governance (CG) in financial institutions (Srairi, 2015). The concept of governance in English 
comes from the Greek word ‘kybernan’, which means to guide, steer or govern (Cadbury, 
2002). This refers to the association between the governors and the governed, such as the 
association between the government and the public (Salin et al., 2017). The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has given a precise definition of CG 
(2004:11) “Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also 
provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means 
of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate 
governance should provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue 
objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate 
effective monitoring.” 
This definition of CG by OECD specifically focuses on the transparency of accounting 
disclosure (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). CG has become an important factor, with the aim of 
providing better and effective safeguards to all stakeholders, and also to make sure that the 
market has no doubts, and research displays a positive relationship among CG and shares 
price (Hasan et al., 2017b). 
Our paper is motivated by the rapid development of Islamic finance and the growing interests 
in the Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs). These institutions are important, especially for 
Muslims, as they supply services that comply with Sharia principles, e.g. interest-free (riba-
based) finance, and avoiding transactions which are prohibited by Sharia, such as alcohol, 
drugs and other activities that bring damage to society (Salin et al., 2017). IFIs should 
recognise society’s interest (Bhatti and Bhatti, 2009) while directing businesses to earn a 
higher profit. For example, IFIs should disclose more information which is reliable and 
relevant, because this information assists all stakeholders in making their decision (Salin et 
al., 2017). Governance in Islam includes all Muslims’ transactions because the resource of 
sharia is considered to be a trust from Allah (God) and an examination of their faith (Saeed, 
1996). So, IFIs have to be honest and fair between all stakeholders and shareholders. The 
definition of Sharia governance is a governance structure that confirms overall actions and 
business deals via IFIs are free from illegal elements, e.g. interest, uncertainty and other 
characteristics (Bahari and Baharudin, 2016).  
We are motivated to focus on Islamic banks because the principles of Sharia make CG in these 
banks both unique and essential. Meanwhile, the CG of IFIs is a structure that permits the 
guarantee of duty to Islamic principles to ensure fairness to all stakeholders. Therefore, 
Sharia governance has a unique characteristic of the Islamic system of financial management. 
Accountability, transparency and adequate disclosure are three essential ingredients in CG. 
According to Baydoun and Willett (2000), the essential aim of corporate reporting from an 
Islamic viewpoint is that it exceeds other targets to permit Islamic institution to present their 
compliance with Islamic law.  
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The lack of previous research that studies the impact of CG on AAOIFI governance disclosure 
in IBs also motivated us to explore this issue. There are a few studies that focus on the 
concept of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs (Abdullah, 2013; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). 
However, these studies have not considered all of the AAOIFI governance and have not 
examined all countries that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards. Therefore, this study 
attempts to fill this gap by examining the impact of CG mechanisms on AAOIFI governance 
disclosure in IBs. The uniqueness of AAOIFI governance standards and their interest to 
safeguard the Islamic banking industry by imposing a comprehensive governance standards 
this motived us to examine what drive banks to adopt these standards. Our findings provide 
practical implications to AAOIFI members as well as Islamic banks. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews relevant literature. 
Section three discusses the research method. Section four reports the main findings. Section 
five concludes and suggests lines for further studies. 
2. Literature Review 
According to Jensen and Meckling, (1976), good CG characteristics are needed to align the 
interest of directors with that of shareholders, and therefore minimise agency costs. IFIs 
usually face more agency problems than conventional banks (Safieddine, 2009). Antonio 
(2001) stated that agency problems also appear in the association between owners and IB 
agents. So, IFIs need good CG for many reasons. First, the problem of separation between 
owners and management, which based on agency theory, is a major factor in IBs compared 
with traditional banks. Also, IBs have more responsibility to shareholders and must make 
sure they are complying with Sharia (Safieddine, 2009; Sarker, 2000). Customers of IBs in 
Bahrain and Sudan are willing to withdraw their deposits if they discover a case of non-
compliance with Sharia (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002). The consequence of non-compliance 
with Sharia in IBs could have a negative effect on their reputation, resulting in the loss of 
customers. To conform to the Sharia principles in IBs, there are important differences 
regarding agency structure in IBs compared to those seen in traditional banks (Zainuldain et 
al., 201). For example, the unique contractual arrangements of mudarabah and musharakah 
investment accounts, present various kinds of agency problems among investment account 
holders (IAHs) who have cash-flow rights and shareholders who own the control rights 
(Safieddine, 2009). 
In general, agency theory suggested that good CG leads to decreases in agency costs, 
improved governance practice, disclosure and financial performance (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Khan et al., 2013). Thus, this theory is used to investigate the determinants of AAOIFI 
governance disclosure. 
The next subsection shows the literature on CG mechanisms that may effect CG disclosure in 
IBs. These are an independent board, board size, board meeting, the duality of CEO position, 
audit committee size (ACs) and audit committee meeting (ACM). 
2.1 Corporate governance characteristics 
Better regulation of CG mechanisms needs a reasonable level of disclosure and sufficient 
information to decrease information asymmetries among whole parties in the company 
(Joshi et al., 2016). Additionally, a robust CG structure raises the confidence of investors, as 
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their investment will be guaranteed by the internal safeguard and a controlling system to 
ensure prudence regarding management activities. Therefore, this leads to a high level of 
disclosure and transparency requirements from public interest (Joshi et al., 2016). Depending 
on the agency theory framework, the CG characteristics are introduced to reduce opportunist 
behaviours among managers, to decrease information asymmetry and to ensure that 
managers work in the interest of the shareholder. It can improve a firm’s internal control 
and, consequently, develop the level of disclosure (Welker, 1995; Ho and Wong, 2001). 
Accordingly, it can be seen that CG characteristics could improve CG disclosure reporting. 
The following paragraphs review relevant literature.   
2.1.1 Independent directors (B.IND) 
Independent directors have received increased interest from CG regulations and academic 
research (Almanasir and Shivaraj, 2017; Ho and Wong, 2001). Also, academics have pointed 
out that independent directors can safeguard shareholders and assist in decreasing agency 
costs (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Fama (1980) argued that a board of directors is the primary 
internal control character for monitoring managers. Also, the existence of independent 
directors on the board may increase the quality of the financial statements (Peasnell et al., 
2005). According to agency theory, independent directors are further capable of limiting 
managerial opportunities (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The theory also suggests that the 
presence of independent managers on the board can reduce information asymmetry 
(Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Most of the prior research was found to have a positive 
relationship among CG disclosure and independent directors such as Abdullah et al. (2015), 
their research examines the determinant of voluntary CG disclosure of 67 IBs in the Southeast 
Asian and GCC region. They found that board independent has a positive relationship with 
voluntary CG disclosure.   
Similarly, Samaha et al. (2012) found that the higher ratio of board independent increases 
the level of disclosure in 100 Egyptian listed companies. Arcay and Vazquez (2005) reported 
a positive relationship between board independence and voluntary disclosure. Gisbert and 
Navallas (2013), study the relationship between voluntary disclosure and CG in a sample of 
62 Spanish firms in 2005. They find that the ratio of independent directors is related with 
increased level of disclosure. 
 In addition, Haniffa and Cooke (2002), state that independent directors can help the board 
with their knowledge and experience. Similarly, Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2010) 
found that independent directors provide a high level of protection to shareholders. 
However, Ho and Wong (2001)  examined the association between the proportion of board 
independent and voluntary disclosure in a questionnaire survey sent to all chief financial 
officers in listed companies in Hong Kong. They found an insignificant association among 
disclosure and independent managers and they explain the reason for their result maybe 
companies in Hong Kong are probable to comply with mandatory disclosure only.  Thus, 
based on agency theory, we hypothesise that:  
H1: There is a positive association between board independence and the level of AAOIFI 
governance disclosure. 
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2.1.2 Board size (B.SIZE) 
The board of directors (BOD) plays an essential role in CG and contains an overall number of 
executive and non-executive managers on the board. Based on agency theory, board size is 
a potential variable of CG with regard to the monitoring of management performance 
(Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Also, the theory suggests that a large number of board directors 
affects the operation of managerial monitoring activities and control (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). According to previous literature, board size affects the level of monitoring and 
disclosure (Rahma and Bukair, 2015). Also, previous studies found mixed results, as Ntim and 
Soobaroyen (2013), argue that the level of voluntary disclosure is positively influenced by 
increased managerial monitoring. Similarly, Al-Janadi et al. (2013), found that board size 
enhances further efficient decision-making and extends information dealing capabilities. 
Also, Wang and Hussainey (2013), indicate that firms with larger boards are more likely to 
disclose more information. Zaheer (2013), found that a larger board size positively influences 
the level of CG disclosure.  
In contrast, others find no significant influence regarding board size on CG disclosure ( Hasan 
et al., 2017b; Arcay and Vazquez, 2005). According to agency theory the current research 
anticipates that a greater board size will increase board control. The consequence of this is 
an improvement in the level of disclosure in IBs. Based on agency theory, this study 
hypothesises that: 
 H2: There is a positive relationship between board size and the level of AAOIFI governance 
disclosure. 
2.1.3 Board meeting (B.M) 
The board’s performance is assessed by the number of meetings held during the year 
(Albawwat and Hussein , 2015). Kanagaretnam et al. (2007), suggested that the more board 
meetings that are held throughout the year, the more the company is able to execute a 
supervisory role better and to reduce information asymmetry. Agency theory suggested that 
the frequency of board meetings affects the strength of the CG component (Khanchel, 2007). 
More board meetings allow members to supervise better managers, which leads managers 
to disclose high-disclosure information to stakeholders (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Laksmana, 
(2008), stated that more board meetings lead companies to be more likely to show an 
increased level of transparency. 
Similarly, Hasan (2011) argued that a high meeting frequency would tend to signal 
achievement and provide extra information to all stakeholders. Accordingly, several previous 
studies found an positive relationship between board meetings and financial reporting and 
disclosure Such as Albawwat and Hussein (2015) who study the relationship between board 
meeting and voluntary disclosure in interim financial reports in Jordanian listed firms for the 
2009-2013. They found that the disclosure level in Jordan listed companies affected by the 
number of board meeting. While Fiori et al. (2016) examined the effectiveness of CG on 
voluntary disclosure in a sample of 35 companies that linked the Pilot programme in 2011 
and a similar 137 firms that did not, they conclude that there is no association between a 
board meeting and the level of voluntary disclosure. Based on agency theory, this research 
hypothesises that:  
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H3: There is a positive relationship between board meetings and the level of AAOIFI 
governance disclosure. 
2.1.4 Duality in position (CEO) 
When the chairman of the board is also the CEO, the role of duality in the position occurs (El-
Halaby and Hussainey, 2016). The CEO is a significant factor of CG because of its sensitive 
characteristic, due to the relationship among the agents and owners (Krause et al., 2014). 
According to agency theory, CEO duality is viewed as harmful, because the agent may follow 
their self-interest at the expense of the owners. Also, the theory states that effective 
monitoring of management execution will be provided via separation between the two 
functions ( Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).  According to Gul and Leung (2004: 356), “Firms with 
CEO duality are more likely to be associated with lower levels of voluntary disclosure since 
the board is less likely to be effective in monitoring management and ensuring a higher level 
of transparency”. According to Donker and Zahir (2008), agency theory predicts that duality 
in position creates a single power for the CEO that influences the efficient control exercised 
by the board. Prior research provided mixed findings on the relationship among duality in a 
position and CG disclosure. Several studies found a negative relationship among the two 
variables: Ezat and El-Masry (2008), found that CEO is negatively correlated with corporate 
disclosure levels. In addition, Gisbert and Navallas (2013), studied the association between 
voluntary disclosure and CG in 62 non-financial Spanish companies listed on the Madrid stock 
market in 2005. They found that CEO is negatively associated with disclosure. This shows that 
duality in a position significantly decreases the disclosure of voluntary information. 
However, other studies did not find an significant association between the two variables 
(Hasan et al., 2017b; Ho and Wong, 2001). While some studies found a positive relationship 
between the two variables, namely Wang and Hussainey (2013), who examined the impact 
of CG on the level of voluntary disclosure and found a positive association between CEO and 
the level of voluntary disclosure. Also, Abdullah et al. (2015), investigated the determinants 
of voluntary CG disclosure practice about 67 IBs. The study found that the separation of the 
role between the board chair and CEO has a positive relationship with voluntary CG 
disclosure. This result suggests that good CG mechanisms improve the level of CG disclosure 
in their annual reports. 
Peng et al. (2007) and Hashim and Devi (2008), suggest the two roles should be separated, 
for causes of independence. This research supposes that the separation roles of functions 
between the chair and chief executive will improve the monitoring clarity and decrease the 
interests of hiding information, resulting in improved CG disclosure in IBs. Based on agency 
theory, IBs without CEO duality issues are predicted to have a higher CG disclosure level. 
Thus, the study develops the following hypothesis: 
H4: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality in a position and the level of 
AAOIFI governance disclosure. 
2.1.5 Audit committee size (ACS) 
Based on agency theory , companies with a larger ACS have a stronger incentive to maintain 
their independence and require more comprehensive disclosure standards (Fama, 1980). 
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According to Mangena and Pike (2005), more effective control will be given to companies 
with larger ACs. Barako et al. (2006) asserted that ACS should lead to the integrity of the 
financial statements and monitoring of the firm’s internal financial regulation and the 
development of corporate information disclosure. Also, Al-Janadi et al. (2013) assert that the 
role of the ACS is a central role to improve the level of disclosure in relation to the financial 
reports. Companies with a larger ACS are faithful to good quality financial performance 
(Abdullah, 2013). It can be argued that ACS can reduce agency conflicts by limiting the 
opportunistic behaviour of agents (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).  
Some previous studies found a positive association between ACS and CG disclosure. For 
example, Almanasir and Shivaraj (2017) examined the determinants of CG voluntary 
disclosure in 61 firms listed in Jordan from 2010 to 2014. They report that a positive 
relationship between ACS and voluntary CG disclosure.  Joshi et al. (2012) find a positive 
relationship between ACS and CG disclosure practice using 850 firms listed on the Malaysia 
Stock Market in 2013. Recently, Sulub et al. (2018) found that IBs which have an established 
AC have a higher level of CG disclosure. 
  Meanwhile, Othman et al. (2014) found that there is an insignificant relationship between 
ACS and voluntary ethics disclosure in a sample of 94 firms listed on Malaysia stock market. 
 According to agency theory, the current research expects that a larger ACS will increase 
board-controlling capabilities and, thus, give a positive impact on the disclosure level practice 
in IBs. Therefore, the study hypothesises that: 
H5: There is a positive association between ACS and the level of AAOIFI governance 
disclosure. 
2.1.6 Audit committee meeting (ACM) 
Greco (2011), stated that the frequency of ACM leads members to an accurate decision about 
a firm’s accounting principles, disclosures and evaluation. Also, Raghunandan et al. (2001), 
stated that audit committees that meet frequently are more likely to be well informed, more 
careful and more knowledgeable about the existing accounting and auditing issues, in 
relation to achieving their duties. Prior research has suggested that the number of meetings 
impacts on there being enough time to control and gain compliance with responsibilities of 
financial performance (Li et al., 2012). Gray et al. (1995) argued that to be responsible, 
managers need to supply financial and non-financial information to their stakeholders.  
Some prior studies found an insignificant relationship between ACM and level of disclosure 
such as Othman et al. (2014) and report that ACM insignificant relationship with voluntary 
ethics disclosure in 94 companies listed in Malaysia Stock Exchange in one the year 2011.  
 Based on agency theory, the frequency of ACMs may provide a level of control in relation to 
the activities carried out by IBs and, therefore, provide better CG disclosure within their 
annual reports. Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H6: There is a positive relationship between the ACM and the level of AAOIFI governance 
disclosure. 
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2.2 Bank Characteristics as a control variables 
Following prior research, we control for banks characteristics such as size (e.g. El-Halaby and 
Hussainey, 2016; and Elfeky, 2017 ); liquidity (e.g. Elzahar and Hussainey ,2012); leverage( 
e.g. Elfeky, 2017); Asset growth (e.g. Nejati ,2013) 
3. Research Methodology and Sample Selection 
3.1 Research Methodology 
The current study uses the following OLS regression model: 
      Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 +………..+ β21X21 + ε 
 Where: 
Y= AAOIFI governance disclosure level (dependent variable)  
X1 - X6 = independent CG variables consist (are as shown in Table 1 below) 
X7 - X21 = control variables (are as shown in Table 1 below) 
β0 = intercept 
β1….. β21 = regression model coefficients (parameters) 
ε = random error (the differences between the predicted and observed value of the AAOIFI 
governance disclosure in sample banks) 
 
 
1TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF DEPENDENT, INDEPENDENT AND CONTROL VARIABLES 
Variable  Definition  Measurement  Source  
Y  CG disclosure 
of AAOIFI 
governance score 
by IBs (Dis level) 
The percentage of 
AAOIFI governance 
information 
disclosure by IBs 
Annual report 
X1 Board 
independence 
(B.IND) 
 
The proportion of 
independent non-
executive directors 
on the board 
Annual report 
X2 Board size (B.SIZE) Number of board 
members 
Annual report 
X3 Board meeting 
(B.M) 
The whole number 
of board meetings 
over the year 
Annual report 
X4  Audit committee 
size (ACs) 
The whole number 
of AC members 
Annual report 
X5  Audit committee 
meeting (ACM) 
The whole number 
of AC meetings 
over the year  
Annual report 
X6   Duality in position 
(CEO) 
1 = chairman and 
CEO are different; 0 
= chairman and 
CEO are the same 
Annual report 
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X7 Firm size(F.SIZE) The natural 
logarithm of the 
firms’ total assets 
Fitch Connect 
(balance sheet and 
income statement) 
X8 Liquidity (LIQ)  Current ratio = 
current total asset 
to current total 
liability 
Fitch Connect 
(balance sheet and 
income statement) 
X9 Leverage(LEV) Long-term debt to 
total equity 
Fitch Connect 
(balance sheet and 
income statement) 
X10 Asset growth 
(A.GRO) 
Firm asset-growth 
ratio 
Fitch Connect 
(balance sheet and 
income statement) 
X11_ X13 Year dummy   
X14- X21 Country dummy   
 
 
3.2 Sample and Data 
The sample includes all IBs that have mandatorily adopted AAOIFI standards. There are ten 
countries that have mandatorily adopted AAOIFI standards “Bahrain, Syria, Qatar, Sudan, 
Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Oman and Mauritius” (Al Qamashoui and Hussainey, 
2016). However, the study excludes IBs in Lebanon, Tunisia and some banks from Sudan, 
because we did not have access to these banks’ annual reports and, despite sending emails 
to these banks, they did not reply. To measure the levels of governance disclosure, we aim 
to collect annual reports from years 2011 onwards. Unfortunately, annual reports for years 
2011 and 2012 were not available for a large sample of banks. We therefore started our 
analysis from year 2013. We end our analysis in 2015 as it was the most recent year at the 
time of the analysis. 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
Table 2 highlights that the mean value of the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure is about 
33%. This means that 33% of the AAOIFI governance disclosure items in the checklist are 
disclosed, on average, per annual report. The minimum value is about 0.04, and the 
maximum value is .70 for the disclosure level, and this indicates that several annual reports 
are disclosed a little information, approximately 4% of the AAOIFI governance disclosure 
items, whereas there are others that disclose much more, namely 70% of the AAOIFI 
governance disclosure items. This reveals that the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in 
IBs is weak.  
Regarding independent variables, the average value of board independence is 0.25 Table 2 
shows the less value for independent managers is 0.00, with the most value of 100%. This 
indicates that some IBs do not have independent directors such as the Liquidity Management 
Centre in Bahrain, while for others all members are independent directors, for instance, Bank 
Nizwa in Oman. 
The mean value for Board size is about 9.  The maximum value of 16 highlights that there are 
several assemblies with a larger number of board members, while the minimum value of 3 
indicates that there are some boards with only three members. Board meetings has a 
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minimum value of 2 indicating that some board members are meeting twice a year. 
Moreover, the maximum value of 10.   The mean value of the duality in position (CEO) 
variable is .98. This indicates the CEO and the chairman of the board are different in most of 
the IBs (98%).  
Table 2 also presents that the average value of the ACs variable is 3.33, with a minimum value 
of 3 and a maximum value of 6. This indicates  that several IBs have three audit committee 
members, while some have AC with a maximum value of six members. The mean value of the 
ACM variable is 4.31, with a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 8. This indicates 
that the audit committee of the sample IBs is held, on average, four times per annum. With 
regard to the control variables (firm characteristics), namely leverage (LEVE), firm size 
(F.SIZE), liquidity (LQ) and asset growth (ASSET GTH), the mean values obtained are 22.7 for 
LEVE, 2,378.9 for F.SIZE, 4.15 for LQ, and 15.6 for ASSET GTH respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Disclosure level 126 .0357 .70 .332 .1646 
Board independence 123 0.00% 100.00% 25.28% 30.19% 
Board size 124 3 16 8.92 2.247 
Frequency of board meeting 83 2 10 5.73 1.616 
CEO duality 123 0 1 .98 .155 
ACS 84 3 6 3.33 .567 
ACM 80 1 8 4.31 1.208 
Firm size 126 7.33 22,893.2 2,378.9 4,090 
Liquidity 126 .00 73.5 4.15 12.22 
Asset growth 124 -34.9 118.07 15.6 22.981 
Leverage 126 .00 399.7 22.79 66.93 
Variables definitions are reported in Table 1 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
Table 3 explains the correlation analysis. It shows that the level of AAOIFI governance 
disclosure is positively correlated with board independence (B.IND) .385 and ACs .400, and 
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these correlations are statistically significant at the 5% level. The correlations between level 
of AAOIFI governance disclosure and other governance and control variables are statistically 
insignificant.  
Correlations between the independent and control variables do not show any evidence of 
multicollinearity. We also calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF). Based on previous 
studies (Field, 2009b; Gujarati, 2003) whether the VIF value is greater than 10, there is 
multicollinearity issue. We find that that the VIF value is higher than 1 and less than 10 (See 
Table 4). Therefore, there are no multicollinearity problems in this study.
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3TABLE 3: PEARSON CORRELATION MATRIX 
 Dis level B.IND B.SIZE B.M CEO ACs ACM  F.SIZE LIQ A.GRO LEV 
N 126 123 124 83 123 84 80 126 126 124 126 
Dis level 1 .385** .080 .161 -.053 .400** .193 -.026 -.018 -.132 -.162 
B.IND  1 .047 -.192 -.321** -.022 -.248* -.019 .010 -.124 -.193* 
B.SIZE   1 .022 .323** .482** .138 .176 -.135 .154 .069 
B.M    1 -.032 .086 .193 .168 -.174 .145 .073 
CEO duality     1 .114 -.003 .093 .036 .108 .055 
ACs      1 .167 .252* -.049 .193 -.119 
ACM       1 .013 -.021 .183 .123 
F.SIZE        1 -.101 -.022 -.059 
LIQ         1 -.072 -.043 
A.GRO          1 .078 
LEV           1 
Variables definitions are reported in Table 1 
*** = significant at the 1% level 
** = significant at the 5% level 
* = significant at the 10% level
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4.3 Regression analysis 
We use Kolmogorov–Smirnov test to check the distrubution of our data. Table 4 illustrates 
that all the variables have a significant value of less than .05, for example, the p-value for 
disclosure level, is 016 with a mean of 33, which indicates that the variables are not normally 
distributed. So, we follow most of the previous disclosure studies (Pallant,2005) to transform 
control variables “Firm size” using log of the main value because be more close to normal 
distribution. 
Table 5 presents our findings. The overall model was shown to be statistically significant, 
where the F-value was found to be 5.074 (0.000), and the adjusted R2 was found to be 51%. 
This indicates that the independent variables explain 51% of the variation regarding the 
AAOIFI governance disclosure variable. This ratio is similar to the percentage reported by El-
Halaby and Hussainey (2016) for 43 IBs across eight countries (51%). Moreover, it is higher 
than the percentage reported by Abdullah et al. (2015) for a sample of 157 IBs in the South 
East Asian and GCC regions (38%). However, relatively, it is lower than the result of 61% that 
was reported by Scholtz and Smit (2015) in a study of sample companies listed on the 
Alternative Exchange in South Africa. In addition, it is important to check the Durbin-Watson 
autocorrelation; the Durbin–Watson statistic is always between 0 and 4. The value in the 
current study is 1.614, which means there is no autocorrelation in the sample. According to 
Gujarati (2003), if the Durbin-Watson amount is equal or close to 2 then the null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation will not be rejected. Although, the Durbin- Watson amount is low of 
the estimated model, the result of the correlation test does not mention the existence of 
important violation of the autocorrelation issue and the current result is consistent with Al-
Bassam et al (2015) who found the values of Durbin-Watson  are ( .924 ; .950; .960; 1.012; 
1.085; 1.316) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
4TABLE 4: NORMALITY TESTING ONE-SAMPLE KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TEST 
 Dis level  B.S B.IND B.M CEO ACs ACM F.SIZE LIQ A.GRO  LEV 
N 126 123 124 83 123 84 80 126 126 124 126 
 
Normal Parameters ab  
Mean .3326190 8.92 25.2846% 5.73 .98 3.33 4.31 2.8977 4.15794 15.6168 22.793 
Std. Deviation .1646821 2.247 30.19459% 1.616 .155 .567 1.208 .71243 12.227 22.9819 66.934 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .089 .127 .311 .169 .538 .424 .302 .094 .385 .144 .367 
Positive .089 .115 .311 .169 .437 .424 .302 .051 .385 .144 .342 
Negative -.078 -.127 -.201 -.117 -.538 -.278 -.273 -.094 -.367 -.072 -.367 
Test Statistic .089 .127 .311 .169 .538 .424 .302 .094 .385 .144 .367 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .016c .000c .000c .000c .000c .000c .000c .008c .000c .000c .000c 
a. Test distribution is normal 
b. Calculated from data 
c. Lilliefors significance correction 
Variable definitions are reported in Table 1 
*** = significant at the 1% level 
** = significant at the 5% level 
* = significant at the 10% level
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                                            5TABLE 5: REGRESSION RESULT: DETERMINANTS OF AAOIFI GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE 
  
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
 
t-statistics 
 
 
 
 
Sig. 
 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
 
Std. Error 
 
VIF 
(Constant) .108 .110 .985 .330  
Board independence .000 .001 .305 .762 3.286 
Board size -.003 .007 -.416 .679 2.923 
Frequency of board 
meeting 
-.001 .009 -.090 .928 1.858 
CEO duality .036 .085 .427 .671 3.111 
ACs .091*** .025 3.677 .001 2.209 
ACM .007 .010 .713 .479 1.455 
Log Firm size -.016 .023 -.717 .477 2.710 
Liquidity .001 .001 1.250 .217 1.138 
Asset growth -.001** .001 -2.403 .020 1.792 
Leverage .000 .000 -.991 .326 1.376 
Fixed effect Year 
and 
country 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: AAOIFI governance disclosure Adjusted R-square .505 
R-square  .628 
F-value 5.074 
F Sig .000 
Durbin-Watson 1.614 
***, ** and * indicate significance at .01, .05 and .1 level. 
Dependent variable: disclosure level. 
Variables definitions are reported in Table 1 
 The coefficient of board independence (B.IND) was found to be statistically insignificant. It 
indicates that board independence is not significantly associated with the AAOIFI governance 
disclosure level. In other words, the results show that the percentage of independent 
directors does not affect the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure. .  Therefore, we reject 
the H1. This result is consistent with some previous studies, such as Solomon (2007), who 
stated that the level of disclosure does not increase in relation to the attendance of an 
independent board, due to some firms having a culture of disclosure and transparency. 
Similarly, Ho and Wong (2001) found an insignificant relationship between board 
independence and voluntary disclosure in listed firms in Hong Kong. The possible explanation 
of this result might suggest that independent directors at IBs are not qualified (e.g. have no 
Islamic Accounting or Finance degree and/or not a specialist in Islamic banking or have no 
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awareness of AAOIFI standards) and therefore they are unable to suggest any improvement 
in disclosure levels.  
The second coefficient of board size is -.003, and this is insignificant at any level. This 
indicates that the number of board members does not affect the level of CG disclosure. This 
confirms the results obtained from Hassan et al. (2017) who found that board size does not 
affect voluntary disclosure. The reason for this result maybe because board members in 
Islamic banks do not have experience of AAOIFI governance and they may be interested in 
examining other issues such as the compliance with Sharia. Based on this study result, we 
reject H2.  
For the third variable, namely board meeting frequency, it is found that it does not play a 
role in improving the extent of CG disclosure in IBs. The coefficient of the board meeting is 
found to be statistically insignificant. This result is consistent with Albawwat and Hussein 
(2015), who found the frequency of board meetings is insignificant with the level of voluntary 
disclosure in Jordanian listed companies. This result could be related to the previous result 
(board size), because if the board size is not interested in AAOIFI governance disclosure or is 
not experienced in AAOIFI governance, then it will not be discussed in the meetings; whether 
they meet once, twice or more times during the year, board meeting frequency will not affect 
the level of disclosure of AAOIFI governance.. This result leads us to reject H3.  
Duality in position (CEO) is also found to be positive and insignificant, which is inconsistent 
with the study expectation that CEO duality issues lead to a higher CG disclosure. This result 
indicates that CEO duality does not affect the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs. 
This result may be due to the fact that IBs place more focus on the role of Sharia governance 
and the independence of SSB than duality in position; and, as a result, if there is duality in 
position in IBs, this does not affect the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure. In other words, 
Sharia governance is more significant than CG characteristics in IBs. Consequently, we reject 
H4. 
For the fifth variable, that of ACS, the coefficient of ACS is found to be positive and statistically 
significant, at the 1% level. This indicates that the number of members on an audit committee 
affects the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs. The result is consistent with the 
arguments of the study and agency theory, which argues that ACS is one of the CG 
characteristics that reduce agency issues via developing disclosure, Barako et al. (2006). Also, 
the result of Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012), in a sample of 97 financial reports in Saudi 
Arabia, found ACs to be the primary determinant of CG disclosure. This result indicates that 
a higher number of AC lead to a higher level of CG disclosure. 
The possible explanation of this result is AAOIFI governance has sent a number of roles for 
AC members include [1] reviewing the interim and annual accounts and financial reports and 
[2] reviewing the IFIs accounting policies and practices and reporting requirements. 
Therefore, we believe that IBS will appoint members at AC who have relevant qualifications 
such as a degree in Islamic banking, Islamic Accounting, Islamic Finance as well as a good 
knowledge of AAOIFI standards. This indicates that the audit committee significantly affects 
the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs. Therefore, if there is a rise in the level of 
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AAOIFI governance disclosure practice, IBs may have to increase their ACs. We therefore 
accept H5. 
The ACM is found to be insignificant: this result indicates that ACM does not have an impact 
on the level of AAOIFI governance disclosure in IBs, which is inconsistent with this study’s 
expectations that the more frequent the ACM, the greater the extent of CG disclosure. This 
might indicate that in the ACM, the members discuss other non-financial reporting AAOIFI 
issues such as reviewing resources and skills, the scope of responsibility, overall work 
programme and reporting lines of the internal audit; reviewing the major outcome of an 
internal audit; reviewing the IFIs code of ethics and the effectiveness with which it is 
implemented; reviewing the effectiveness of the IFIs system for monitoring compliance with 
Sharia rules and principles; ensuring that independence and professional integrity of auditors 
is not compromised; Reviewing the compliance with Sharia rules and principles.  This result 
leads to a rejection H6. 
Regarding four control variables of firm characteristics, only one is found to be statistically 
significant, namely asset growth. The other three control variables, namely liquidity, firm size 
and leverage, are found to be statistically insignificant.  
From the above analysis, it shows that ACS plays an important role in the IBs that mandatorily 
adopt AAOIFI standards to enhance AAOIFI governance disclosure. It is consistent with 
agency theory, that argues that ACS is one of the most important CG mechanisms that help 
to reduce agency problems by developing disclosure (Barako et al., 2006). In addition, agency 
theory Fama (1980) shows that larger audit firms have a stronger incentive to maintain their 
independence, and require more stringent and extensive disclosure standards.  
The reason for this result may be due to the fact that IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI 
standards, are following the standards with regard to this point, which requires there to be 
at least three audit committee members (AAOIFI, 2015). Also, there is a greater possibility 
that ACS leads to the disclosure of more information to all stakeholders because of the high 
level of accountability to ensure that IBs are compliant with Sharia. The other reason for this 
result may be because ACs in relation to IBs is unlike ACS in relation to non-IFIs, as the 
responsibility of ACS in IBs is not only to perform an audit of the financial information, but 
also to be compliant with sharia.  
The analysis provides support for the arguments relating to agency which suggest that a large 
AC have better auditing performance standards than small AC (Fama, 1980). The outcomes 
showed a significant positive association between AAOIFI governance disclosure and ACs. 
The outcomes proved that the audit committee significantly affects the level of AAOIFI 
governance disclosure in IBs. Therefore, if there is a rise in the level of AAOIFI governance 
disclosure practice, IBs may have to increase their ACs. 
The results shown in the current study can be useful for the role of the SSB in the IBs, because 
the SSB has the ability to review and confirm that all of the activities are completely 
compliant with Sharia rules. This means that the SSB could have the authority to prohibit and 
evaluate the banks’ guidance when necessary. Otherwise, the SSB should disclose AAOIFI 
governance information to the public. To do so, IBs will highlight their AAOIFI governance 
standards, and that, in turn, will increase their reputation and improve the confidence of 
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current clients and, as a consequence, engage with new investors and realise a higher level 
of trust from the public in IBs. This implication is supported by the result of El-Halaby et al. 
(2018) which suggested that IBs should improve the level of disclosure to engage more 
clients, based on their faith and loyalty of following sharia compliance.  
 
5. Conclusion  
This paper aims to examine the association between some CG mechanisms and the disclosure 
level of AAOIFI governance standards by IBs. The years of the study were 2013 to 2015 and 
involved 126 banks, including all IBs that have adopted AAOIFI’s mandatory standards. 
However, the study excludes IBs in Lebanon, Tunisia and some banks in Sudan, because we 
could not access these banks’ annual reports. 
The current research contributes to Islamic accounting literature, by identifying the drivers 
for the disclosure of AAOIFI governance standards, and by considering the impact of bank 
governance on the disclosure level among IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards. The 
study found that ACs was the only mechanism that was statistically significant and positive, 
and all of the other CG characteristics were statistically insignificant. This result indicates that 
IBs that mandatorily adopt AAOIFI standards were following the standards with regard to this 
point, which requires there to be at least three members of an audit committee (AAOIFI, 
2015). Also, there is a greater possibility that ACs in IBs leads to the disclosure of more 
information to all stakeholders because there is a high level of accountability to ensure that 
IBs are compliant with Sharia.  
This study has a number of limitations that could be taken as avenues for future study such 
as this research depends on the annual reports only as a research source. Further research 
could include the collection of data from other sources, like websites, social networks and 
interim reports. Also, the current study focuses on IBs that mandatorily adopt the AAOIFI 
standards only, while there are other IBs that follow the AAOIFI standards voluntarily. 
Therefore, further research could compare the AAOIFI standards of compliant banks with 
non-compliant ones. 
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